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Abstract 
A considerable body of work in AI has been concerned with aggregating measures of confirmatory and 
disconfirmatory evidence for a common set of propositions. Claiming classical probability to be inadequate or 
inappropriate, several researchers have gone so far as to invent new formalisms and methods. Some of these 
have become widely used and theoretically explored [ 17, 15). We show how to represent two major approaches 
to evidential confirmation not only in terms of transform£Jd (Bayesian) probability, but also in terms of each other; 
which: 
• unifies two of the leading approaches to confirmation theory, by showing that a revfsed MYCIN 
Certainty Factor method [12] is equivalent to a special case of Dempster-Shaler theory; 
• gives us a well-understood axiomatic basis, i.e. conditional independence, to interpret previous work 
on quantitative confirmation theory; in particular, 
• provides a new axiomatic analysis and interpretation of Dempster's Rule for an important special 
case; 
• which gives a firmer epistemological basis for acquiring, and for using in decisions, Dempster-Shafer 
belief functions aggregated via Dempster's Rule; 
• substantially resolves the "take-them-or-leave-them" problem of priors: MYCIN had to leave them 
out, while PROSPECTOR had to have them in; 
• recasts some of confirmation theory's advantages in terms of the psychological accessibility of 
probabilistic information in different (transformed) formats; 
• helps to unify ttw representation of plausible/ inexact/ uncertain reasoning (see also [11]); 
• clarifies the place of evidential confirmation in a general scheme for probabilistic reasoning: as 
concerned with nggrcgating "pnrallcl" updates or c�angcs in probability; and 
• in particular marries evidential confirmation to the strengths of Bayesian, arbitrary-conditional, 
probability: especially, if-then rules and forward and bac�;ward chaining. 
lntroduction1 
1 Limitations of space prevent us from Introducing the terminology and d efinitions of MYCIN, PnOSPECTOR, and Dompster-Shafor. We 
assume tho reader is somewhat familiar with them. 
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A considerable body of work in AI has been concerned with aggregating measures of confirmatory and 
disconfirmatory evidence for a common set of propositions. On the face of it, this problem may not appear to be 
compatible with the usual notion of probability. One apparent difficulty is that if we formalize one piece of 
evidence as: 
and another as: 
then we may have an inconsistency, e.g. if r1 < q2. Other difficulties also are often cited; however, this paper is 
not the place to go into them. Claiming classical probability to be inadequate or inappropriate, several 
researchers have gone so tar as to invent new formalisms and methods. Some of these have become widely 
used and theoretically explored [17,15). 
Two of the leading approaches to evidential reasoning are MYCIN-type certainty factors and Dempster-Shafer 
theory. MYCIN helped to stimulate the interest of the AI community in the problems of probabilistic reasoning in 
general, and in the concept of confirmation in particular. MYCIN-type certainty factors are widely used, e.g. in 
PUFF [1] and in current EMYCIN-based expert systems2. They also bear substantial similarity to several other 
scoring schemes used in AI for uncertainty, e.g. INTERNIST's. Dempster-Shafer theory has received much 
attention in the AI community recently [2,6, 13, 14,9,7, 1 0,8]. Naturally, there has been interest in trying to relate 
these two approaches. For example, Jean Gordon and Ted Shortliffe in [9] propose a scheme for a partial 
mapping of MYCIN Certainty Factors into Dempster-Shafer belief functions. We propose a different ·mapping 
which is invertible, i.e. an isomorphism, unlike theirs. 
Recent work by David Heckerman [12] providing <l probabilistic interpretation for MYCIN's Certainty Factors 
establishes a now basis for formulating evidential confirmation in terms of probability. He recasts Certainty 
Factors in such a way as to preserve their formal properties, e.g. as proposed in [17} and later extended in [3], 
but in addition to satisfy the requirements of a (Bayesian, i.e. conditional) probabilistic interpretation. Moreover, 
in most cases, the revised certainty factors are numerically quite close to the original versions. 
The key technical points of this paper are constituted by the mutual cross-mapping of uncertainty measures and 
their aggregation rules for tt1ree different schemes: Heckerman's revised Certainty Factors, PROSPECTOR's 
likelihood ratios, and Dempster-Shafer belief functions (restricted to the "simple", "chance", case). 
We show how to represent two major approaches to evidential confirmation not only in terms of transformed 
(Bayesian) probability, but also in terms of each other3. In particular, the revised MYCIN approach is mapped 
exactly into a special case of Dempster-Shaler theory. 
As far as Dempster·Shafer tlleory goes, the significance is two-fold. Firstly, we discover that both the (revised) 
Cortainty Factor method and the PROSPECTOR method are equivalent to a special case of Dempster-Shafer 
theory, and thus are in effect subsumed by it. 
2e.g. those developed using tho EMYCfN.I.Jascd technology of Teknowlcdgc, Inc. of Palo Alto, CA. 
3[11] shows how lim more general framework of (Bayesian) conditional interval probability can incorporate evidential reasoning; it contains 
Dempster·Shafer theory as a special case. 
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Secondly, we have a new analysis of Dempster's Rule, which lies at the heart of any semantic (as well as 
decision-theoretic) account of Dempster-Shafer theory. We show how by using a non-linear but invertible 
transformation, we can interpret a special case of Dempster's Rule In terms of a conditional independence 
assumption. This kind of assumption is something with a history In AI (e.g. PROSPECTOR), and is ubiquitous in 
the literature on probability theory and applications. Thus we can understand Dempster-Shafer theory, at least in 
this special case, as doing something fundamentally the same as PROSPECTOR and (Hcckerman's revised} 
CF's. This seems to unify nicely the two leading approaches to evidential confirmation with each other, and with 
Bayesian probabilistic reasoning, at the deep level of aggregation assumptions, i.e. the semantics of the 
"operations" on the uncertainty measure "data types". 
CF's Are A Transform of Likelihood Ratios, With Independence Assumption 
We show that the revised Certainty Factor method is equivalent to the scheme for combination of evidence used 
in PROSPECTOR [5]. The revised certainty factors, which are called " &3" in [12], correspond via an invertible, 
non-linear transformation to likelihood ratios, which are called " AS" in [5]; the combination rule for revised 
certainty factors corresponds to the product rule for combining multiple pieces of evidence in [5]. The 
assumptions underlying each method, [ 12] and [5]. are equivalent: they are the conditional independence or 
antecedent ("evidence") events given consequent ("hypothesis") events. 
Mapping# 1 
Let us take the odds-likelihood form of Bayes' Rule as our starting point: 
p( H I E) I p( H) 
--------- I 
p(�H I E) I p(,H) 
p(E I H ) 
p(E I ,H) 
PROSPECTOR defines the quantity on the right hand side above as a "A", here denoted by L(H , E). The 
combination rule, i.e. aggregation operation, is commutative and associative: 
The identity is L = 1 . L ranges on [0 , oo). 
N.B.: The underlying assumption here, and thus In each of the equivalent schemes, is that of 
conditional independence of the E1 given H and given ,H. 
This is used to give posterior odds on H, after applying several pieces of evidence (which might have been 
several uncertain "if-then" rules, i.e. Bayesian, conditional probabilities, all concluding the same proposition, H), 
from prior odds on H: 
p( H) 
= L(H , E1 1\ ... 1\ E0) • 
p(,H} 
Heckerman's revised certainty factor, which he calls "!::..", is here denoted by D(H , E). It Is arrived at by the 
invertible transformation 4: 
4This author orio l nated the mapping of Heckerman's scheme to PnOSI'ECTDrt's; he dlscussoslt ln his paper [12): sec his acknowlodgernents. 
Wo are coordinating writing the two papers so that they wilt be, hopefully, coherent yet complementary. 
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L - 1 
D == 
L + 1 
1 + D 
L 
1 - D 
The combination rule (aggregation operation) is {naturally, commutative and associative): 
= 
The identity is D = 0. D ranges on [-1 , + 1] . 
Combining CF's Is Multiplying Likelihood Ratios. Is Dempster's Rule 
We show furthermore that both the revised Certainty Factor method (D)'and the PROSPECTOR method (L) are 
equivalent to a special case of Dempster-Shafer theory [15,4]. Via another invertible transformation, we show a 
correspondence between Lls (D), and thus AS (L), and belief measures (8, below) on a [0 , 1] scale. We treat this: 
belief measure as a Dempster-Shafer belief function. The combination of Lls, and of AS, then corresponds 
exactly to the application of Dempster's Rule to ordinary single-valued probabilities. The conditional 
independence assumption underlying the PROSPECTOR updating rule is thus discovered to be equivalent to a 
special case of Dempster's Rule. 
Mapping# 2 
Dempster-Shafer Belief we will denote here by B{H, E), where E represents the index of the belief function, which 
we can regard as the evidential "source" of the belief function. Dempster-Shafer belief is arrived at by another, 
invertible transformation: 
L 
B 
L + 1 
B 
L 
1 - B 
and, equivalently: 
1 + D 
B 
2 
D 2*R - 1 
The combination rule (aggregation operation) is just Dempster's Rule, here specialized to point-valued 
( " chance" in Shafer's terminology") belief: 
= 
--
---------------------------------�--------------------
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The identity5 is 8 == 0.5 . 8 ranges on [0 , 1] . 
Note that here [1 . 8( H, E)] = 8(•H, E), since we are in the special "chance" case. More precisely, 8( ., E.)6 I I I 
corresponds to a class of Dempster-Shafer belief functions: those which are the "extensions" (onto more 
fine-grained frames of discernment) of the belief function 8eli0( . ), where Beli0 is defined on the frame of 
discernment (H, •H} as equivalent to the "mass" function Massi0 (on the same frame of discernment): 
Mass;0( H) 
Mass;0(•H) 
= B( H, E;) 
B(•H, E;) "I 
We will call B{ .,Ei) an "extended, simple, chance" belief function. "Simple" here means that the "focus", i.e. set 
of propositions with non-zero mas�;. is minimal in size7: i.e. has only two members. "Chance" refers to the focus 
being a subset of the frame of discernernent, i.e. of the set of primitive propositions8. 
Viewing Evidence As Updates Versus As Priors 
We can think of all three schemes as manipuloting changes in pro ba bil it y  (which we can think of as updates), 
while relying on a null "prior" of sorts: the identity for tho combination rule. While in PROSPECTOH, priors wore 
specified separately, in terms of straiaht probability {in odds form, actually} instead of as an L, in tho Certainty 
Factor and Dempster·Shafer approaches, all evidence is given equal status. However, we see that a substantive 
"prior" in U1e PI�OSPECTOR approach, e.g. 
odds(H) 
p ( H) 
p(•H) 
= X 
is just equivalent to a piece of evidence 
L(H , Priorlnfo) X 
aggrenated with the vacuous "system prior", i.e. identity: 
L(H , {}) = l . 
Thus the requirement for priors in PROSPECTOR is no handicap, relative to Certainty Factors and 
Dernpster-Shafer. Indeed, those who avoid specifying priors in the latter schemes are in fact making an 
nssumption by relying implicitly on the vacuous prior. 
Similarly, we can encode arbitrary priors into Certainty Factors. If our prior on His: 
p(H I Priorlnfo) = Y 
then we cun represent it as just another certainty factor: 
5
11 you thought the identity for Dempster's llule is the bounded interval [0, 1) don't worry: this is a special case, remember. 
6our notation r(.) menm; the function F as a whole, i.e. ( "Ax. f(x)) in lmnbda·calculus notation. 
l without lim belid function boinq trivial, i.e. representing certainty 
13111e terminology of Dl�rnpster·Shafcr t11eory usee! hero is drawn from Shafer's [15). 
189 
D(H , Priorlnfo) = 2*Y - 1 
Thus each scheme, because of its commutative and associative combining rule, can be regarded as treating all 
pieces of evidence (updates) on equal terms: everything and nothing is a "prior". 
Synthesis 
It makes sense that the mapping of (revised) Certainty Factors (D) is to the "one-number" special case (as 
opposed to the "two-number" general case, i.e. bounded intervals) of Dempster-Shafer belief. 
It makes sense that (revised) Certainty Factors (D) are mapped into the the special case of Dempster-Shafer 
belief in which bounds meet. After all, Certainty Factors represent the uncertainty of a proposition with only one 
number. Much of the historical modification of the Certainty Factor approach (e.g.[3]), and much of its ad-hoc 
feel and formal difficulties, have revolved around the summarizing of the evidence in a single number rather than 
a pair. (Originally, there were MB and MD, "measure of belief" and "measure of disbelief", repectively.) Our 
mapping helps to show in what way full Dempster-Shaler theory is richer and more powerful than Certainty 
Factors. This helps to justify and rationalize the AI community's (e.g. Shortliffe's) interest in, and attraction to, 
Dempster-Shafer theory. 
Each of the three schemes seems to be useful in different ways. Lis particularly helpful in characterizing the 
assumption underlying the combination rule9, and thus in providing a sound probabilistic interpretation for D, as 
well as an alternative probabilistic interpretation for B. D has been found to be psychologically useful in MYCIN 
and EMYCIN work, e.g. especially for knowledge acquisition. D has a nice symmetry, represented by numerical 
negation, between confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence. Now we have a rigorous and understandable 
axiomatic "semantics" for the meaning of the numbers in D. Finally, B is useful for understanding D and L to be 
subsumed by Dempster-Shaler theory. 
L also provides a link to conditional probabilities and thus to applying chains of uncertain "if-then" rules. We can 
regard "evidential reasoning" or "confirmation theory", in the sense of Certainty Factors and Dempster-Shaler 
theory, as being concerned with how to combine, i.e. aggregate, several probabilistic conclusions "in parallel", 
i.e. which all bear on the same proposition or sot of propositions. Each of these probabilistic conclusions may be 
rather primitive, i.e. an irreducible estimate from some opaque source, or it may be arrived at by an extensive 
chain of conditional probabilistic reasoning. See [11] for more discussion. 
Conclusions 
Understanding evidential confirmation in terms of transformed (single-valued, Bayesian) probability: 
• unifies two of the leading approaches to confirmation theory, by showino that tho (revised) MYCIN 
Certainty Factor method is equivalent to a special case of Dempster-Shaler theory; 
• gives us a well-understood axiomatic basis, i.e. conditional independence, to interpret previous work 
on quantitative confirmation theory; in particular, 
• provides a new axiomatic analysis and interpretation of Dempster's Rule for an important special 
case; 
9G, defined as (In L), is even more conceptually elegant: it has an additivo aggregation rule. Indeed, I !eckerman originally conceived the 
aggregation rule for 0 in terms of G. 
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• which gives a firmer epistemological and "canonical" ([ 16]} basis for acquiring, and for using in 
decisions, Dempster-Shaler belief functions aggregated via Dempster's Rule; 
• substantially resolves the "take-them-or-leave-them" problem of priors: MYCIN had to leave them 
out, while PROSPECTOR had to have them in; 
• recasts some of confirmation theory's advantages in terms of the psychological accessibility of 
probabilistic information in different (transformed) formats; 
• helps to unify the representation of plausible/ inexact! uncertain reasoning (see also{11]); 
• clarifies the place of evidential confirmation in a general scheme for probabilistic reasoning: as 
concerned with aggregating "parallel" updates or changes in probability; and 
• in particular marries evidential confirmation to the strengths of Bayesian, arbitrary-conditional, 
probability: especially, if-then rules and forward and backward chaining. 
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